REPORT ON COAL SHIPS
WHICH EXPERIENCED ELEVATED CARGO TEMPERATURES
IN THE PORT OF LOS ANGELES/LONG BEACH

SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1981

M/V KARTINI     M/V BALTIC NEPTUNE     M/V WARSCHAU    M/V GLOBAL MARITIME

INTRODUCTION

Starting on 5 September 1981 the first of four ships that were all to experience some serious heating problems with their coal cargoes arrived at the Port of Los Angeles-Long Beach (LA/LB). The U. S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office (MSO) and many of the other resources of the Port of LA/LB expended considerable effort in the handling of this unusual situation. The four vessels arrived at LA/LB between 5 September 1981 and 27 September 1981. At this writing (late December 1981) one has reported safely arriving at its final destination in Japan with its original cargo; one has reported arriving in Taiwan with its cargo; one has reloaded its cargo which is still on shore waiting for a sister ship to pick it up (scheduled to start 27 December). This report will describe the events that occurred in LA/LB as a result of the arrival of these four ships. It will also indicate some of the things that we have learned as we worked on the problem.

One of the primary things that was learned was that there is limited general knowledge of the causes and ways to handle spontaneous heating in coal on ships. This appears to be due to the fact that until recently the coal that was shipped was of a grade and quality such that what little spontaneous heating may have occurred was not enough to cause any serious problems. When the first ship with elevated coal temperatures arrived at LA/LB, the Coast Guard and other interested parties in the port started gathering as much information as possible on the subject of hot coal on ships. It was quickly discovered that there was very little in the literature (most of what was found dated back to the 1930's or earlier where coal was more commonly carried for bunkers). No regulations concerning the prevention of spontaneous heating in coal were found. The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Code for the Stowage and Shipment of Bulk Cargoes gave some brief guidance concerning spontaneous combustion, but as more information was collected, there developed some conflicts over the application of the IMCO Code to the specific situations that developed in LA/LB. For example the Code suggests using copious amounts of water (with consideration for stability), but the expert consultants nearly all agreed that water should be avoided as much as possible due to the dangers of acid formation, steam explosions, hydrogen generation/explosion, and over-stressing the vessel. The use of salt water was particularly discouraged due to possible chlorine gas generation and the fact that it could render the coal useless.

The lack of guidance from other sources led most of the decision makers involved with these coal ships to rely very heavily on the advice of the various expert consultants that were called in to assist with each case. There was some difference in the opinions of the experts that were involved but they all were in general agreement that the problems experienced by these ships required immediate attention.'

Consultants were called upon for their experience with regard to coal, the spontaneous heating/combustion of coal, and/or fighting fires in coal. Those who responded to the scene displayed considerable professionalism and deserve a great deal of credit for the successful handling of the problems with the four ships. Those who responded by telephone were equally interested in helping and provided useful information the aid the decisions being made on scene.

1.


THE M/V KARTINI

The first vessel to arrive in LA/LB with coal cargo that had elevated temperatures was the 935 foot Indonesian bulk carrier KARTINI. The following is a brief synopsis of the events that occurred.

The KARTINI arrived at anchorage C-10 in Long Beach Harbor at 1545 (all times will be local time using the 24 hour clock) on 5 September 1981 to load bunkers prior to departing for Taichung, Taiwan. The vessel had approximately 53,560 long tons of coal on board which had been loaded at the International Marine Terminal in Myrtle Grove, Louisiana. The loading had been completed on 20 August 1981. Enclosure (1) shows some of the properties of the coal.

At approximately 1630 the vessel began bunkering. At 1750 "smoke" was observed venting from the number 7 and 9 cargo holds. The vessel immediately secured bunkering operations and called the Coast Guard reporting a fire on board. Two Coast Guard vessels and three fireboats from the Long Beach Fire Dept. (LBFD) responded and arrived on scene between 1800 and 1815. The initial investigation by Coast Guard and LBFD personnel revealed that there was no fire and that the "smoke" was in fact steam apparently being generated by elevated temperatures in the coal piles. Most Coast Guard and LBFD personnel departed at that time.

At 1935 two officers from the Coast Guard MSO boarded the vessel to review the situation and meet with LBFD and ship's personnel. CAPT Lee McGee, a marine surveyor, attended the meeting as a representative of the vessel's charterer and P&I club. Together, it was agreed that the situation on board did not require immediate emergency action. A plan to insert temperature monitoring probes into the coal piles on 6 September was formulated. Authorization to resume bunkering operations was approved since it was felt that pressed-up bunker tanks were safer than empty but not gas free tanks. It was also assumed that a full tank could act as a heat sink for any high temperatures that might develop near the bottom of the cargo holds.

Bunkering operations resumed at 0100 on 6 September and were completed without incident. At 0800 all remaining cargo hatch covers were opened and steam was observed rising from hold 4. All other holds (except 7, 9, and 4) appeared normal. At 1630 Coast Guard personnel reboarded the KARTINI to check the progress of probe insertion and temperature monitoring. Probes consisting of 3/4" galvanized pipe had been inserted into the cargo in holds 7 and 9. Two pipes were placed in the two holds near the centerline, one forward and one aft. The popes were driven into the coal in ten-foot sections using a hammer and hardwood block. A pipe coupling was then added and another ten foot section driven in. This was repeated until the pipes were nearly to the bottom of the coal. The temperatures were taken by lowering a mercury type thermometer on a string, letting it remain at one significantly. The initial temperatures ranged from 130 degrees F to 152 degrees F. Temperature reading seemed to fluctuate within each probe but remained within the given range. This seemed to be fairly stable and that there was no information on hand that indicated what could be expected from a coal cargo with temperatures in that range, the Marine Surveyor and Coast Guard agreed that there was no reason to deny permission for the vessel to sail provided that a temperature monitoring program was established for the voyage.

The KARTINI departed Long Beach at 2000, 6 September on a rhumb line course to Taiwan. The ship's crew was instructed to take temperature readings every four hours and relay them to the vessel's principals. The master was also advised that opening the cargo holds as weather allowed would cool and ventilate the cargo.

2.



On 8 September the KARTINI's agent stated that she was reporting temperatures up to 180 degrees F in hold 7 and a sulfur/hydrocarbon smell around the hatch. The master of the KARTINI, Captain MANUS, indicated that he was returning to LA/LB. The events which unfolded subsequently revealed that this was an exceptionally wise decision that probably prevented the occurrence of a serious fire on the KARTINI while at sea.

Through telephone consultations with Dr. W. F. Berry (coal consultant from Pittsburgh, PA) it was decided that flooding the holds with Nitrogen (N2) would help stabilize the cargo and buy the time necessary to make arrangements for a berth and equipment necessary to offload the cargo. Dr. Berry's recent experience with other coal ships that had similar heating problems indicated that the safest procedure was to offload the coal to cool it as soon as possible.

The KARTINI returned to LA/LB early on the morning of 10 September. Holds 4, 7 and 9 were venting considerable amounts of steam that has a distinct hydrocarbon odor. The majority of the steam was coming from hold 7 which was approximately twice as long as the other holds and had two sets of hatch covers designated 7A and 7B. Most of the steam from this hold seemed to be coming from the forward half (7A). Temperatures as high as 199 degrees F were reported, however, it was recognized that the method of lowering a thermometer on a string was not the idea method of taking temperatures and some of the early temperature readings may be off by as much as 20 degrees F. Electronic thermocouples that cold be lowered down the pipes or stuck into the coal piles ultimately replaced the thermometers. The situation on the vessel slowly deteriorated while the vessel's agents (primarily Capt. Ian McDonald of Kerr Steamship Co., Inc.) attempted to overcome difficulties that had arisen with regard to contracting for N2 and finding a berth that was deep enough and had facilities for the coal. The Coast Guard Captain of the Port established a Safety Zone around the vessel.

Dr. Berry arrived shortly after midnight the morning of 11 September and was taken to the ship. Due to the rising temperatures, the increased gas/steam production, and the low pH of the water in the cargo hold bilge wells, his prognosis was that the coal must come off the ship immediately.

The vessels agents had investigated berths in Mexico, San Diego, Long Beach, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle and determined that berth 52 Los Angeles was the only option available to them. A meeting was held at the Coast Guard MSO at 0530 on 11 September and an agreement was reached as to the conditions under which the vessel could be moved to berth 52 LA and start offloading the coal. Parenthetically it is a real tribute to the spirit of interest and cooperation that exists in the Port of LA/LB when you consider that more than 30 people representing various operations, jurisdictions, and authorities met at 0530 in the morning and reached a sound decision with regard to the safety of a vessel and the port without getting bogged down in red tape or politics.

By 1315, 11 September the coal was being removed from the KARTINI. It appeared that it would simply be a matter of continuing to offload the hottest areas and that the danger of serious fire had been averted. However, at approximately 0200 on 12 September a fire broke out in the coal in hold 7 that took nearly three hours to put out. Exposing the hot coal to air caused it to burst into flame in spite of the blanket of N2 that had been kept in the hold since the offloading began. It soon became apparent that the offloading would require attention to possible fire during the entire process and that the speed of the offloading must be increased.

3.



The most effective means of fire fighting was to keep charged hoses available and if flames were seen they were hit with a quick burst of water. This worked most of the time, however, certain hot spots were so large that it took considerable amounts of water to cool them. As the fires became larger the LAFD set up a portable monitor with a 600 GPM capacity. This was very effective since it actually stirred the fire and tended to knock down the burning piles. The steam that was produced when water was applied reduced visibility considerably and made the job of spotting the grab buckets very difficult. It soon became apparent that the N2 blanket was not effective in preventing the surface fires and so it was secured.The initial offloading process used mobile cranes located on the pier. These cranes had relatively small grab buckets (about 2 1/2 cubic yards). Four cranes were set up but not all were working at the same time. On 16 September a 165 ton capacity crane with an 8 yard bucket started offloading in hold 7. On 17 September a large floating crane was moved into place and started offloading with a 9.5 yard bucket.

The whole process was constantly besieged with problems and delays that required immediate attention and innovative thinking to solve. For example: When the ship first arrived at the berth its draft was almost the same as the water available at the berth. When the tide went out she rested on the bottom which was angled so the vessel wanted to slide away from the pier. This was solved by having tugs available at low tide to hold her against the pier. After enough cargo was removed to keep her from touching bottom this was secured. Another problem was that the coal had a consistency such that its angle of repose was near 90 degrees (i.e. it stood up in shear cliffs and did not fall into the center of the hold). This was finally solved by swinging the buckets into the mounds of coal on the sides to knock them down and then lowering bulldozers to do the final moving of the coal to the center of the hatch (after the fires were out). The heat from one hold set the adjacent hold, which up to that time had not shown any serious temperature problems, on fire. Fire fighting water had to be pumped out of hold 7 before offloading could continue. As the ship rose higher the shore based cranes could no longer reach into the holds. The smaller buckets, would tumble and roll causing their leads to become tangled if not set down on a nearly level area. The space at berth 52 was rapidly used up and the coal had to be piled too high for safe storage. The list of problems goes on and on.

These problems were eventually solved and by the end of September all the coal was out. A survey of the vessel revealed that there had been minimal damage to the holds. The KARTINI was taken to another berth in Long Beach to make repairs. The various interests in the coal had decided that they wanted to try to reload the coal back on the KARTINI for transport to Taiwan. The Coast Guard Captain of the Port established some requirements that had to be met before such a procedure would be permitted. In the meantime the coal which was at berth 52 LA was stored in such a way that there was the possibility that reheating could rapidly progress. The LAFD with Coast Guard concurrence ordered the coal moved. The cargo interests started moving the coal to an abandoned air field on Terminal Island. With the permission of the LAFD they had the coal piles on berth 52 LA analyzed by Mr. Magnuson (coal consultant from Pittsburgh, PA) and Dr. Maloney (spontaneous combustion consultant from Irvine, CA) and it was determined that the piles were reasonably safe to leave on berth 52 LA until the KARTINI could be made ready to accept the coal. The detailed plan for reloading the coal was presented to the Coast Guard. The plan provided for monitoring of coal temperatures as the coal was being loaded and the installation of temperature probes in each hold to allow continuous monitoring of temperatures throughout the voyage.

The plan was approved and the coal was reloaded without significant incident. Some of the probes were destroyed during the packing and leveling process that was done to the top layer of coal. There were still a sufficient number of probes to adequately monitor conditions in the pile and the KARTINI was given permission to depart. At 2215 on 9 November the KARTINI departed. The hottest temperature when the ship was loaded was 100 degrees F in hold 4. The KARTINI reported the maximum temperatures daily. By 20 November the hold 4 maximum had risen to 107 degrees F. All the remaining holds were below 100 degrees F.

4.



THE M/V BALTIC NEPTUNEThe second ship to arrive in LA/LB (Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach) with coal that showed elevated temperatures was the 820 foot Liberian bulk carrier BALTIC NEPTUNE. The following provides additional information on those events.

The information gained through the experiences with the KARTINI indicated that other ships were loading similar coal in New Orleans. Coast Guard MSO (Marine Safety Office) LA/LB contacted the Captain of the Port in New Orleans and asked for a list of ships that might have this type of coal that were headed west. The BALTIC NEPTUNE was on the list and an attempt was made to contact her. The BALTIC NEPTUNE was on the list and an attempt was made to contact her. She was finally contacted a few days out of LA/LB and was advised of the potential problem with the coal cargo and told to have the cargo temperatures monitored by a cargo surveyor and reported to the Coast Guard before taking on bunkers at LA/LB.

The BALTIC NEPTUNE arrived around midnight on 19 September and was boarded by Capt. McGee (cargo surveyor). He completed a round of temperatures at 0200 on 20 September and found a high of 140 degrees F. The ship's crew had been taking temperatures through the bilge sounding tube during the voyage and had not measured anything higher than about 105 degrees F. until 19 September at which time some temperatures increased by as much as 16 degrees F. in 12 hours. By 1400 on 20 September temperatures as high as 178 degrees F. were found in the coal. The coal on the BALTIC NEPTUNE had not been leveled and was either in one very large mound with sides sloping well down the interior of the hold or many smaller mounds located throughout the hold. In most cases the temperatures that were the hottest were found in the sides of the mounds. Much of the coal had a wet appearance and there we a high percentage of fines. The coal from some of the holds could be molded like clay and water could be squeezed out of some of it. There were small amounts of steam coming from some of the piles. Some of the properties of the coal are shown in enclosure (1).

Because berth 52 LA still was covered with coal and the BALTIC NEPTUNE was drawing over 40 feet aft, the availability of berths for offloading the coal was even more limited than it was for the KARTINI. Based on the location of the hot spots and information that indicated that coal in piles creates a "chimney effect" (air is drawn in near the bottom as the heated air exits near the top increasing the availability of oxygen), the ship was advised to level and compact the coal in the holds as soon as possible. It was felt that this would at least slow the heating process down.

The principal interests in the BALTIC NEPTUNE hired personnel from BOOTS and COOTS in Houston, TX. These people have considerable expertise in fighting hydrocarbon fires. Their experience is generally related to oil fields but they have worked on fires in other bulk commodities such as baled rubber. They recommended the use of water mixed with a surface-active agent (Surfactant) which would be injected with a pipe probe into the hot spots. A plan was worked out to minimize the risk of steam explosions and they were given permission to inject up to 500 gallons of water in each hold.

The injection of water started 23 September and cooled the coal considerably but after a period of time the temperature would climb back to or near where it had been. This required that the BOOTS and COOTS personnel constantly go from hold to hold injecting water to keep the temperatures down. The ships owners hired Mr. Magnuson and Dr. Maloney who formulated a plan that would allow the BALTIC NEPTUNE to proceed without offloading the coal. The plan called for the leveling and compacting the coal in the holds and the insertion of temperature monitoring probes. The plan also called for two BOOTS & COOTS personnel to go with the ship to inject water if the need arose. The Coast Guard authorized them to proceed with the plan and approval to depart would be based on how stable the coal could be made by the planned process. By 9 October the cargo holds had been leveled and packed and the temperature probes were providing an indication of the stability of the coal. Some of the temperatures showed a slight or nearly a steady condition but several showed fairly significant increases. There were many temperatures above 130 degrees F. The injection of water was used to further cool and stabilize the cargo. The injection process worked fairly well and the cargo appeared stable enough to permit the ship to proceed as long as there was a constant capability to inject water as necessary. This was decided even though many of the temperatures were above 130 degrees F. and some were over 180 degrees F. The ship was also inspected by a representative of the Liberian Government and the Coast Guard for compliance with SOLAS requirements and ability to conduct a fire and boat drill. After some initial difficulties the BALTIC NEPTUNE was given permission to depart on 23 October. The BALTIC NEPTUNE departed that day and started sending daily reports of the highest two temperatures in each hold. These data indicated that some of the holds continued to increase in temperature and required the injection of water while others remained steady or even declined. Throughout the trip none of the temperatures were permitted to exceed 185 degrees F. A report of the condition of the coal as it was offloaded has not been received yet.

5.


THE M/V WARSCHAU

The third ship covered by this report was the 700 foot German bulk carrier WARSCHAU. A summary follows:

The WARSCHAU was on the list of vessels having loaded coal in New Orleans which might have properties similar to that loaded on the KARTINI. She was contacted by message and advised to measure her temperatures. She reported back that she had no temperatures over 130 degrees F. as measured through the permanently installed sounding tubes at each end of the holds. When she arrived on 25 September her cargo was surveyed and measurements up to 10 feet down in the coal showed temperatures over 200 degrees F. The coal was mounded and hot spots were generally found in the sides of the mounds. Enclosure (1) lists some of the properties of her coal.

The WARSCHAU had cranes installed at each hatch and grab buckets had been ordered delivered at LA/LB to be used in offloading the coal in Taiwan. The ship used these buckets to dig out the hot spots and spread them on the top of the cooler coal in an attempt to cool it. Although this temporarily cooled the coal that was spread out, it was found that the spot where the coal had been removed and in some cases the coal that had been spread out had risen in temperature to the 220 degrees F. range in a few hours. The Master and owners of the WARSCHAU in consultation with Dr. Berry decided that for the safety of the vessel they would remove the coal.

The WARSCHAU was drawing approximately 39 feet aft and, therefore, the berths available to offload her were limited. After a process of trying to find a location at various points on the west coast, the owners came to the conclusion that their only reasonable option was to use berth 52 LA. Most of the nearly 54,000 tons of coal from the KARTINI was still on berth 52 LA and the prospect of piling another 45,000 tons on top of that was not met with much optimism by the Port of LA (in particular the LAFD) or the Coast Guard. Nonetheless the owners presented a plan whereby the coal could remain on the pier for only a short time and be immediately moved to Terminal Island. The plan met the approval of the LAFD and Coast Guard and permission was granted for WARSCHAU to move into position to offload on 30 September.

The WARSCHAU was moored outboard of two floating cranes. This kept her in deep enough water to avoid touching bottom and allowed the cranes better access to her holds. They started with one 8 and one 9 1/2 cubic yard bucket and then changed the 8 to a 25 cubic yard bucket. They had up to 25 trucks at one time in position to move the coal. By 9 October all the coal was out. There were no fires and a minimal amount of smoke/steam during the offloading. There was negligible damage to the hold from the coal.

The coal from WARSCHAU is still (late December) on the ground on Terminal Island. The vessel owners and cargo interests have arranged to have the coal moved. A sister ship to the WARSCHAU (the M/V DRESDEN) is scheduled to begin loading the coal on 27 December under a plan worked out in consultation with Dr. Berry and Dr. Maloney. The plan provided for a temperature monitoring system installed in the coal before and during loading and the packing of the top layer to prevent the entry of air. The coal temperatures will be measured just prior to loading and nothing over 105 degrees F. will be on board.

6.


THE M/V GLOBAL MARITIME

The last ship to arrive at LA/LB with hot coal problems was the 528 foot Panamanian bulk carrier GLOBAL MARITIME. The Following is a summary.

The GLOBAL MARITIME was on the list of vessels that had loaded coal believed to have properties similar to that found on the KARTINI. She was advised by message of the possible problem and told to have her cargo surveyed prior to taking on bunkers in LA/LB. The ship reported through her agent that she had temperatures as high as 160 degrees F. prior to arrival. She arrived at LA/LB on the afternoon of 17 September and was boarded by Capt. McGee and Coast Guard personnel. Holds 1 and 4 were loaded with coal from the Delta Mine, were loaded at anchorage in New Orleans and had not been leveled prior to departing. Holds 2, 3, and 5 were loaded at the dock with coal from the Gibson Mine and holds 3 and 5 had been leveled by bulldozer. See enclosure (1) for a listing of some of the coal properties. There were hot spots in the mounded coal, just as there was in the other ships, with highs of 185 degrees F. Even the coal that had been leveled showed some elevated temperatures; especially near where the surface had cracked open or up against a bulkhead where the bulldozer had not packed the coal and it was stacked in a mound against the vertical section.

The vessel interests formulated a plan in consultation with Dr. Berry to stabilize the coal and continue on to Japan, the original destination of the coal. The concept of the plan was accepted by the Coast Guard Captain of the Port and the GLOBAL MARITIME was given nine conditions that had to be met before permission to sail would be granted.

The plan called for leveling and packing the coal with bulldozers and then using mechanical packers (vibrators) to insure a complete sealing of the top layer right up to the bulkheads. Temperature probes were driven into the coal. The number of probes in each hold was a function of the temperatures that had been found in that hold up to then. Holds 2 and 5 had 14 probes. The remaining holds had between 7 and 10. The probes consisted of sections of pipe driven to depths up to 30 feet. Three thermo-couples were lowered into each pipe and fixed at three locations: one near the top, one in the middle, and one near the bottom. The pipes were then sealed to slow the convection process in the pipe and the wires were lead to the hatch trunk for the hold. To take a round of temperatures, a digital thermometer was plugged into each lead (which had a label indicating which probe it was) and the temperature recorded.

When the probes were first installed there were several temperatures of more than 130 degrees F. recorded (primarily in hold 5). The ship attempted to speed up the cooling process by placing a few tons of dry ice in the holds and then closing the hatches. The desired effect was that the cold of the dry ice would help with extraction of the heat already in the piles and the CO2 gas that would evolve as the dry ice vaporized ("melted") would exclude oxygen and therefore reduce any further heating. There were no appreciable effects that were noticed on the temperature probes after the dry ice was consumed. In some of the holds the temperatures continued to climb in the others they leveled off. None showed significant reductions.

7.


ENCLOSURE 1
PROPERTIES OF COAL

The following table shows some of the properties of the coal that was on board four ships which experienced coal heating problems in LA/LB Harbor in September, 1981. These data were taken from various documents associated with each ship. Their accuracy has not been verified.

 

 

SHIP

 

 

 

  KARTINI BALTIC NEPTUNE WARSCHAU GLOBAL MARITIME

Loaded at

Int. Marine Term
Myrtle Grove, LA

Int. Marine Term
Myrtle Grove, LA

Int. Marine Term
Myrtle Grove, LA

Electrocoal Trans
Devant, LA

Date

10-20 August 1981

20 Aug-2 Sep 1981

2-8 Sep 1981

5-14 Sep 1981

Supplier

Cravat Coal Co.

Cravat Coal Co.

Cravat Coal Co.

Delta Mine

Gibson Mine

Destination

Taiwan Power Co.

Taiwan Power Co.

Asia Cement Co.

Kawasaki
Japan

Toyohashi
Japan

Quantity

54,633 MT

59,341 MT

45,410 MT

9,856 MT

15,023 MT

Loaded From

barges & ground

barges & ground

barges

barges

dock

Moisture

10.04%

10.88%

11.39%

6.75%

12.97%

Ash

12.83%

14.70%

14.18%

 

 

Volatiles

36.38%

35.83%

 

 

 

Gross Heat

12,012 BTU/LB

11,733 BTU/LB

11,843 BTU/LB

 

 

Sulfur

2.20%

2.30%

2.45%

2.54%

1.53%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.

.

.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


HOT COAL CARGO

With the increased emphasis on coal use and shipment some problem areas have been identified. Recently three vessels loaded with steam coal have experienced rising cargo temperatures to the point of spontaneously bursting into flames in at least one case. The rising temperature is the result of a spontaneous reaction within the vessel hold and takes place within a short time of the vessel's departure from the loading port.

To obtain the desired mixture of characteristics for an order of coal, a shipper may mix coal of different types so that the average characteristics will be correct (BTU, sulfur content, moisture, ash, volatile matter). This may result in the layering of the coal within the vessel's holds. Steam coal, which is now being exported in greater amounts contains more impurities and is more likely to have the chemical reaction than the more pure metallurgical coal seen in the past. Evidently in the three cases mentioned, a layer of high moisture coal was laden on top of a layer of high pyritic sulfur coal. During the voyage the moisture seeped down into the high pyritic sulfur coal creating a chemical reaction producing sulfurous acid and releasing heat. This process continued long enough to commence oxidation which resulted in a fire difficult to extinguish.

Currently there are no regulations for the proper handling and stowage of coal. IMCO has proposed rules which have not yet become final. However some considerations to minimize this problem are:

When loading a steam grade cargo, mix all types of coal throughout the hold

Monitor temperatures within the hold during the voyage at least once daily at three different locations in each hold and at three levels from the top to the bottom of the hold

Insure the hold is clean and free of electrical sources of ignition

Do not load coal in heavy rain conditions

Damage to the vessel will result if sulfuric acid is formed by wet sulfur coal

No smoking should be permitted nor naked flames permitted in the cargo hold area

The cargo space should not be entered until verification of proper oxygen level has been made and personnel have proper breathing apparatus. If it is suspected that the cargo could spontaneously ignite, the cargo space should be completely closed down to prevent the entry of air. Once the chemical reaction between water and the high sulfur coal begin, the cargo will produce its own oxygen.

At 55 degrees C (131 F) the coal may be a fire hazard and the vessel should consider proceeding to the nearest port or the coal should not be loaded into the vessel if pier-side.

When loading, the cargo should be trimmed and packed level all the way to each bulkhead in each hold. It should not be left in mounds. Ideally this should be done as cargo is loaded but at the very least to the last layer of cargo. Apparently a mound of coal allows air to enter at the bottom and migrate toward the top thus providing oxygen to increase the heating process. Coal should be level right up to the bulkhead. It should also be packed tight with a heavy piece of equipment to drive the air out and slow the entry of further air. It should be noted that unlevel coal creates a chimney effect which may promote the cargo to rise in temperature. Leveling of coal in barges and ships is extremely important to help stabilize cargo temperatures. High levels of hydrogen sulfide, carbon monoxide, and methane gas have been found in steam coal cargo holds. These toxic gases may coexist with an oxygen level in a hold which in itself may indicate human entry is safe. You should insure that holds are checked for all of these toxic gases prior to entry.

The above information in part is from the proposed IMCO codes titled Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes, Appendix B. This publication can be obtained from 101 Piccadilly, London.

 

 
 
 

 

 


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