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Through telephone consultations with Dr. W. F. Berry (coal consultant from Pittsburgh, PA) it was decided that flooding the holds with Nitrogen (N2) would help stabilize the cargo and buy the time necessary to make arrangements for a berth and equipment necessary to offload the cargo. Dr. Berry's recent experience with other coal ships that had similar heating problems indicated that the safest procedure was to offload the coal to cool it as soon as possible. The KARTINI returned to LA/LB early on the morning of 10 September. Holds 4, 7 and 9 were venting considerable amounts of steam that has a distinct hydrocarbon odor. The majority of the steam was coming from hold 7 which was approximately twice as long as the other holds and had two sets of hatch covers designated 7A and 7B. Most of the steam from this hold seemed to be coming from the forward half (7A). Temperatures as high as 199 degrees F were reported, however, it was recognized that the method of lowering a thermometer on a string was not the idea method of taking temperatures and some of the early temperature readings may be off by as much as 20 degrees F. Electronic thermocouples that cold be lowered down the pipes or stuck into the coal piles ultimately replaced the thermometers. The situation on the vessel slowly deteriorated while the vessel's agents (primarily Capt. Ian McDonald of Kerr Steamship Co., Inc.) attempted to overcome difficulties that had arisen with regard to contracting for N2 and finding a berth that was deep enough and had facilities for the coal. The Coast Guard Captain of the Port established a Safety Zone around the vessel. Dr. Berry arrived shortly after midnight the morning of 11 September and was taken to the ship. Due to the rising temperatures, the increased gas/steam production, and the low pH of the water in the cargo hold bilge wells, his prognosis was that the coal must come off the ship immediately. The vessels agents had investigated berths in Mexico, San Diego, Long Beach, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle and determined that berth 52 Los Angeles was the only option available to them. A meeting was held at the Coast Guard MSO at 0530 on 11 September and an agreement was reached as to the conditions under which the vessel could be moved to berth 52 LA and start offloading the coal. Parenthetically it is a real tribute to the spirit of interest and cooperation that exists in the Port of LA/LB when you consider that more than 30 people representing various operations, jurisdictions, and authorities met at 0530 in the morning and reached a sound decision with regard to the safety of a vessel and the port without getting bogged down in red tape or politics. By 1315, 11 September the coal was being removed from the KARTINI. It appeared that it would simply be a matter of continuing to offload the hottest areas and that the danger of serious fire had been averted. However, at approximately 0200 on 12 September a fire broke out in the coal in hold 7 that took nearly three hours to put out. Exposing the hot coal to air caused it to burst into flame in spite of the blanket of N2 that had been kept in the hold since the offloading began. It soon became apparent that the offloading would require attention to possible fire during the entire process and that the speed of the offloading must be increased. 3. |
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The whole process was constantly besieged with problems and delays that required immediate attention and innovative thinking to solve. For example: When the ship first arrived at the berth its draft was almost the same as the water available at the berth. When the tide went out she rested on the bottom which was angled so the vessel wanted to slide away from the pier. This was solved by having tugs available at low tide to hold her against the pier. After enough cargo was removed to keep her from touching bottom this was secured. Another problem was that the coal had a consistency such that its angle of repose was near 90 degrees (i.e. it stood up in shear cliffs and did not fall into the center of the hold). This was finally solved by swinging the buckets into the mounds of coal on the sides to knock them down and then lowering bulldozers to do the final moving of the coal to the center of the hatch (after the fires were out). The heat from one hold set the adjacent hold, which up to that time had not shown any serious temperature problems, on fire. Fire fighting water had to be pumped out of hold 7 before offloading could continue. As the ship rose higher the shore based cranes could no longer reach into the holds. The smaller buckets, would tumble and roll causing their leads to become tangled if not set down on a nearly level area. The space at berth 52 was rapidly used up and the coal had to be piled too high for safe storage. The list of problems goes on and on. These problems were eventually solved and by the end of September all the coal was out. A survey of the vessel revealed that there had been minimal damage to the holds. The KARTINI was taken to another berth in Long Beach to make repairs. The various interests in the coal had decided that they wanted to try to reload the coal back on the KARTINI for transport to Taiwan. The Coast Guard Captain of the Port established some requirements that had to be met before such a procedure would be permitted. In the meantime the coal which was at berth 52 LA was stored in such a way that there was the possibility that reheating could rapidly progress. The LAFD with Coast Guard concurrence ordered the coal moved. The cargo interests started moving the coal to an abandoned air field on Terminal Island. With the permission of the LAFD they had the coal piles on berth 52 LA analyzed by Mr. Magnuson (coal consultant from Pittsburgh, PA) and Dr. Maloney (spontaneous combustion consultant from Irvine, CA) and it was determined that the piles were reasonably safe to leave on berth 52 LA until the KARTINI could be made ready to accept the coal. The detailed plan for reloading the coal was presented to the Coast Guard. The plan provided for monitoring of coal temperatures as the coal was being loaded and the installation of temperature probes in each hold to allow continuous monitoring of temperatures throughout the voyage. The plan was approved and the coal was reloaded without significant incident. Some of the probes were destroyed during the packing and leveling process that was done to the top layer of coal. There were still a sufficient number of probes to adequately monitor conditions in the pile and the KARTINI was given permission to depart. At 2215 on 9 November the KARTINI departed. The hottest temperature when the ship was loaded was 100 degrees F in hold 4. The KARTINI reported the maximum temperatures daily. By 20 November the hold 4 maximum had risen to 107 degrees F. All the remaining holds were below 100 degrees F. 4. |
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The information gained through the experiences with the KARTINI indicated that other ships were loading similar coal in New Orleans. Coast Guard MSO (Marine Safety Office) LA/LB contacted the Captain of the Port in New Orleans and asked for a list of ships that might have this type of coal that were headed west. The BALTIC NEPTUNE was on the list and an attempt was made to contact her. The BALTIC NEPTUNE was on the list and an attempt was made to contact her. She was finally contacted a few days out of LA/LB and was advised of the potential problem with the coal cargo and told to have the cargo temperatures monitored by a cargo surveyor and reported to the Coast Guard before taking on bunkers at LA/LB. The BALTIC NEPTUNE arrived around midnight on 19 September and was boarded by Capt. McGee (cargo surveyor). He completed a round of temperatures at 0200 on 20 September and found a high of 140 degrees F. The ship's crew had been taking temperatures through the bilge sounding tube during the voyage and had not measured anything higher than about 105 degrees F. until 19 September at which time some temperatures increased by as much as 16 degrees F. in 12 hours. By 1400 on 20 September temperatures as high as 178 degrees F. were found in the coal. The coal on the BALTIC NEPTUNE had not been leveled and was either in one very large mound with sides sloping well down the interior of the hold or many smaller mounds located throughout the hold. In most cases the temperatures that were the hottest were found in the sides of the mounds. Much of the coal had a wet appearance and there we a high percentage of fines. The coal from some of the holds could be molded like clay and water could be squeezed out of some of it. There were small amounts of steam coming from some of the piles. Some of the properties of the coal are shown in enclosure (1). Because berth 52 LA still was covered with coal and the BALTIC NEPTUNE was drawing over 40 feet aft, the availability of berths for offloading the coal was even more limited than it was for the KARTINI. Based on the location of the hot spots and information that indicated that coal in piles creates a "chimney effect" (air is drawn in near the bottom as the heated air exits near the top increasing the availability of oxygen), the ship was advised to level and compact the coal in the holds as soon as possible. It was felt that this would at least slow the heating process down. The principal interests in the BALTIC NEPTUNE hired personnel from BOOTS and COOTS in Houston, TX. These people have considerable expertise in fighting hydrocarbon fires. Their experience is generally related to oil fields but they have worked on fires in other bulk commodities such as baled rubber. They recommended the use of water mixed with a surface-active agent (Surfactant) which would be injected with a pipe probe into the hot spots. A plan was worked out to minimize the risk of steam explosions and they were given permission to inject up to 500 gallons of water in each hold. The injection of water started 23 September and cooled the coal considerably but after a period of time the temperature would climb back to or near where it had been. This required that the BOOTS and COOTS personnel constantly go from hold to hold injecting water to keep the temperatures down. The ships owners hired Mr. Magnuson and Dr. Maloney who formulated a plan that would allow the BALTIC NEPTUNE to proceed without offloading the coal. The plan called for the leveling and compacting the coal in the holds and the insertion of temperature monitoring probes. The plan also called for two BOOTS & COOTS personnel to go with the ship to inject water if the need arose. The Coast Guard authorized them to proceed with the plan and approval to depart would be based on how stable the coal could be made by the planned process. By 9 October the cargo holds had been leveled and packed and the temperature probes were providing an indication of the stability of the coal. Some of the temperatures showed a slight or nearly a steady condition but several showed fairly significant increases. There were many temperatures above 130 degrees F. The injection of water was used to further cool and stabilize the cargo. The injection process worked fairly well and the cargo appeared stable enough to permit the ship to proceed as long as there was a constant capability to inject water as necessary. This was decided even though many of the temperatures were above 130 degrees F. and some were over 180 degrees F. The ship was also inspected by a representative of the Liberian Government and the Coast Guard for compliance with SOLAS requirements and ability to conduct a fire and boat drill. After some initial difficulties the BALTIC NEPTUNE was given permission to depart on 23 October. The BALTIC NEPTUNE departed that day and started sending daily reports of the highest two temperatures in each hold. These data indicated that some of the holds continued to increase in temperature and required the injection of water while others remained steady or even declined. Throughout the trip none of the temperatures were permitted to exceed 185 degrees F. A report of the condition of the coal as it was offloaded has not been received yet. 5. |
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SHIP
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KARTINI | BALTIC NEPTUNE | WARSCHAU | GLOBAL MARITIME | ||
Loaded at |
Int. Marine Term |
Int. Marine Term |
Int. Marine Term |
Electrocoal Trans |
|
Date |
10-20 August 1981 |
20 Aug-2 Sep 1981 |
2-8 Sep 1981 |
5-14 Sep 1981 |
|
Supplier |
Cravat Coal Co. |
Cravat Coal Co. |
Cravat Coal Co. |
Delta Mine |
Gibson Mine |
Destination |
Taiwan Power Co. |
Taiwan Power Co. |
Asia Cement Co. |
Kawasaki |
Toyohashi |
Quantity |
54,633 MT |
59,341 MT |
45,410 MT |
9,856 MT |
15,023 MT |
Loaded From |
barges & ground |
barges & ground |
barges |
barges |
dock |
Moisture |
10.04% |
10.88% |
11.39% |
6.75% |
12.97% |
Ash |
12.83% |
14.70% |
14.18% |
|
|
Volatiles |
36.38% |
35.83% |
|
|
|
Gross Heat |
12,012 BTU/LB |
11,733 BTU/LB |
11,843 BTU/LB |
|
|
Sulfur |
2.20% |
2.30% |
2.45% |
2.54% |
1.53% |
.
.
.
HOT COAL CARGO
With the increased emphasis on coal use and shipment some problem areas have been identified. Recently three vessels loaded with steam coal have experienced rising cargo temperatures to the point of spontaneously bursting into flames in at least one case. The rising temperature is the result of a spontaneous reaction within the vessel hold and takes place within a short time of the vessel's departure from the loading port.
To obtain the desired mixture of characteristics for an order of coal, a shipper may mix coal of different types so that the average characteristics will be correct (BTU, sulfur content, moisture, ash, volatile matter). This may result in the layering of the coal within the vessel's holds. Steam coal, which is now being exported in greater amounts contains more impurities and is more likely to have the chemical reaction than the more pure metallurgical coal seen in the past. Evidently in the three cases mentioned, a layer of high moisture coal was laden on top of a layer of high pyritic sulfur coal. During the voyage the moisture seeped down into the high pyritic sulfur coal creating a chemical reaction producing sulfurous acid and releasing heat. This process continued long enough to commence oxidation which resulted in a fire difficult to extinguish.
Currently there are no regulations for the proper handling and stowage of coal. IMCO has proposed rules which have not yet become final. However some considerations to minimize this problem are:
When loading a steam grade cargo, mix all types of coal throughout the hold
Monitor temperatures within the hold during the voyage at least once daily at three different locations in each hold and at three levels from the top to the bottom of the hold
Insure the hold is clean and free of electrical sources of ignition
Do not load coal in heavy rain conditions
Damage to the vessel will result if sulfuric acid is formed by wet sulfur coal
No smoking should be permitted nor naked flames permitted in the cargo hold area
The cargo space should not be entered until verification of proper oxygen level has been made and personnel have proper breathing apparatus. If it is suspected that the cargo could spontaneously ignite, the cargo space should be completely closed down to prevent the entry of air. Once the chemical reaction between water and the high sulfur coal begin, the cargo will produce its own oxygen.
At 55 degrees C (131 F) the coal may be a fire hazard and the vessel should consider proceeding to the nearest port or the coal should not be loaded into the vessel if pier-side.
When loading, the cargo should be trimmed and packed level all the way to each bulkhead in each hold. It should not be left in mounds. Ideally this should be done as cargo is loaded but at the very least to the last layer of cargo. Apparently a mound of coal allows air to enter at the bottom and migrate toward the top thus providing oxygen to increase the heating process. Coal should be level right up to the bulkhead. It should also be packed tight with a heavy piece of equipment to drive the air out and slow the entry of further air. It should be noted that unlevel coal creates a chimney effect which may promote the cargo to rise in temperature. Leveling of coal in barges and ships is extremely important to help stabilize cargo temperatures. High levels of hydrogen sulfide, carbon monoxide, and methane gas have been found in steam coal cargo holds. These toxic gases may coexist with an oxygen level in a hold which in itself may indicate human entry is safe. You should insure that holds are checked for all of these toxic gases prior to entry.
The above information in part is from the proposed IMCO codes titled Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes, Appendix B. This publication can be obtained from 101 Piccadilly, London.
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