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We had time before the arrival of the Pontos to read AIA Bulletin No. 94 and review the metal turnings fire in holds No. 4 and 5 of the S.S. Severn River, a WWII Liberty Ship. The fire on the Severn River occurred in the spring of 1962. We recalled that this fire proved to be "a headache", as the owners insisted upon not following the recommendations of the fire officers and ended up spending nearly $70,000 to save a cargo that finally sold for 10% of its original value. However, a more recent metal turnings fire occurred on April 13th. this year. This was a serious fire at berth 210, Terminal Island, at the Hugo-Nue Proler complex.

This fire involved a pile of lathe turnings in the open that was approximately 25' high, 150' wide and 250' long. Our strategy on this fire was the use of the company's cranes and bull dozers to remove the turnings, wet them down as they were removed and spread them out in the yard not over two feet high. A portable deluge set was placed on top of the pile in order to cool the shavings and perhaps reach the seat of the fire. Soon after the stream was directed into the "hot spot", an explosion occurred and the upper portion of the pile of turnings was involved with bright red flames, burning freely for a few seconds. We had experienced a Stream or Hydrogen explosion or both. Several of these explosions occurred during that afternoon and night. As we neared the center of the burning mass the fire was so intense that the magnet used on the crane to remove the almost molten turnings would not pick up the shavings.

After the pile has been extinguished, we found a molten mass at the bottom that was as large as a modern automobile. Also, as the center of the fire was exposed, we observed the color of the burning mass and thought it to be nearing the lemon color stage. We felt that we had temperatures close to 1700 F.

With these thoughts and experiences in our minds, we prepared to meet the Pontos at anchorage with Fireboat 4 supplemented with the members of Engine Company 49. We hoped that the fire aboard the Pontos was controlled, but were prepared to commence extinguishment if the situation was severe enough.

The attached chronological report of the events that occurred as the fire officers first boarded the Pontos until she sailed is prepared only as a guide line for our Chief Officers and as a documentation to shipping men whose ships may become involved in a similar situation. With Constant Manning, any Battalion Chief may be hired to work SOD in one or both of the Harbor Battalions.

In every instance, whether night or day, you may have to actually engage in fire fighting operations, so take your turnouts with you. However, DO NOT ENGAGE IN ANY MEETINGS WITH SHIPPING MEN ABOARD A SHIP IN YOUR TURNOUTS...ALWAYS BE IN UNIFORM. We know we are Class I, but shipping men and ships' officers relate their opinions of firemen with what they have observed in ports throughout the world.

METAL LATHE TURNINGS FIRE, MOTOR SHIP PONTOS

The Pontos cleared Angels Gate at 0030 hours, June 16, 1970, and proceeded to Anchorage "C". As we stood by waiting for her to anchor, our guess as to her type was a good one; she was a large modern Bulk Carrier. We learned later from her Captain that the Pontos was built in Sweden in 1966 for Norwegian owners. She is 657' long with a beam of 88' 6" and a moulded depth of 57'. The Pontos is listed as 48,000 deadweight tons, 367,000 gross tons and 25,000 net tons.

The fire officers boarded the Pontos at 0050 hours and contacted the Chief Mate. (All officers on the Pontos spoke excellent English). The mate said that the No. 4 hold was closed and sealed on June 13th, and that 55 cylinders of CO-2 were pumped into the hold. He thought that the temperature may have dropped a little since the CO-2 application. He also told us that the only temperature readings that could be taken were from the bottom of the upper wing tanks and the space above the turnings.

The Port Warden and civilian representatives came aboard at 0120 hours and a conference was held in the Master's cabin. In attendance at this first meeting were: The ship's Master, Captain A. D. Carlsen; the Chief Mate; the Port Warden, Captain Lionel DeSanty; Captain M. L. McGee, representing the owners of the vessel; Mr. Dwayne Walsworth, General Steam Ship Corp., agents for the owners; Mr. George Dupuy, representing the insurers of the ship and the hull; Battalion Chief F. M. Brown, Battalion 6, "B" Platoon; Battalion Chief H. M. Inlow, Battalion 16, "B" Platoon and Captain P. P. Pleick, Fireboat 4, "B" Platoon.

The Port Warden, as spokesman for the group, made the necessary introductions then asked Captain Carlsen to relate what had occurred prior to and after he had sailed.

This was the 9th trip for the Pontos under charter to the Mitsui Co. The Pontos had always carried metal lathe turnings in No. 4 hold.

The Pontos finished loading 8000 long tons of scrap metal lathe turnings in Jersey City, New Jersey, May 30, 1970, and sailed that same day for Mizushima, Japan. (The turnings in the No. 4 hold are known in the trade as "short shoveled steel turnings").

The temperature of the turnings taken on top of the pile reached 200 F. on May 29th., dropped to 190 F. on the 30th, and the Pontos was given clearance to sail. (In Los Angeles Harbor, all loading of scrap metal is stopped when the temperatures reach 190 F. Los Angeles port authorities will not allow a ship to sail with temperatures over 130 F.).

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A severe rain storm occurred on the 27th and 28th of May and the lathe turnings loaded the last two days were thoroughly soaked by the rain and loaded in this condition.

Captain Carlsen said that he ordered a bulldozer placed into the hold to spread the turnings around to trim the ship and also to pack the turnings. (This is normal procedure for this type of cargo).

The shippers of the cargo requested Captain Carlsen to leave the No. 4 hold open as long as the weather permitted. Members of the ships' crew took readings each day and they were recorded in the Captains' log. On June 9, 1970, after the Pontos had cleared the Panama Canal and her course set for Japan, the crew noticed fire on top of the pile of turnings at the after port area. They used small amounts of water from the ships fire lines and attempted to remove some of the cargo and replace it with cold turnings. Captain Carlsen was asked by the fire officers if he had heard any explosions when they used the water. He said that they had heard "popping noises". The same area burned again on the 10th. and was extinguished. No fires occurred on the 11th and 12th. The hold still remained open. Temperatures taken on the 9th of June and thereafter reached 260 F. Fire broke out again on the 13th with greater severity. Captain Carlsen ordered the hatch covers closed and 55-100 pound cylinders, of the vessels own CO-2 system, were pumped into the hold.

Captain Carlsen radioed his home office notifying his owners of the fire and received permission to change course and head for the California coast if he deemed it necessary. On June 15, 1970, Captain Carlsen decided to radio and request permission to enter this port. (He later told us that San Diego had no bulk loading facilities, so he decided upon Los Angeles Harbor).

When Captain Carlsen had finished his report, the fire officers obtained the dimensions of the No. 4 hold which are: 88' 6" wide, 95' long and 49' deep. The turnings were 42' deep with 7' of space above them. The total capacity of that hold was 368,000 cubic feet. By comparison, the 8000 long tons in the No. 4 hold were equivalent to two-thirds of the entire cargo space on a WW II Liberty ship. From the Captain's report and with our previous experiences, we formed a plan to handle the burning scrap metal.

A general discussion followed with every one participating and offering suggestions.

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Captain Carlsen seemed a little cool towards the fire officers and once stated that what he wanted was an expert from some company handling scrap metals to tell him what to do. It was explained to the Captain that we had successfully fought the same type of cargo in a liberty ship a few years ago and just recently had controlled a severe fire in a very large pile of lathe turnings. He was told that we knew his problem and wouldn't flood the hold or use any water unless absolutely necessary. After this Captain Carlsen weighed all of our recommendations and suggestions very carefully and never was in disagreement with our plans or ideas.

The Port Warden turned the discussion over to the fire officers after telling the group that our recommendations and decisions were final and that he would support any or all of them. We presented our recommendations and plan for control of the fire:

The Pontos was to be moved to berth 49 at daybreak as that wharf had 54 feet of water. The Pontos was drawing 36 feet and was too deep to move into any other facility.

At least 10 tons of bulk CO-2 must be available at the dock as the Pontos tied up. The bulk CO-2 must be available at the dock as the Pontos tied up. The bulk CO-2 container must have adequate hose to reach the No. 4 hold with an appropriate nozzle and qualified operator at all times.

We would furnish the necessary men, hose, and equipment to back up the CO-2, if it became necessary.

The turnings were to be removed with a clam shell and loaded into waiting dump trucks. The turnings were then to be taken to an open area and spread out not more than two feet high.

A means of extinguishing the fires in the off loaded shavings was to be provided.

We had an alternate plan; that of off loading at least 1000 tons in the other six holds onto a barge and leaving the barge at anchor. This would raise the draft to less than 30 feet and the Pontos could then use the facilities at Hugo-Nue Proler (a scrap metal handling facility at Berth 210).

Captain Mcgee never allowed the alternate plan to be presented. He also said the ship would not move to Berth 49. He requested a delay of 48 hours. He flatly stated that he was determined to get the entire cargo of metal turnings to Japan with no damage to the turnings. Captain McGee then presented his plan which was to bring out at least 10 tons of bulk CO-2 by barge. This amount of CO-2 was to be added to the hold to achieve a 70% concentration of CO-2. He reasoned that the additional CO-2 would cool the turnings to below 160 F. and he would get clearance to sail for Japan. Likewise, he proposed to refill the ship's 55 empty CO-2 cylinders and to buy an additional 50 cylinders and lash them to the deck for added safety. He was positive that the Pontos could arrive in Mizushina with an undamaged cargo with his plan. We could not offer any written documentation that could prove Captain McGee to be wrong. Everyone agreed to the 48 hour extension except Mr. Dupuy. He wanted to off load the turnings as soon as possible. After all, he represented the insurers of the hull and ship and didn't want the hull to suffer expensive fire damage.

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With the acceptance of the plan presented by Captain McGee, one stipulation was made by the fire officers. Captain McGee was to hire a qualified Marine Chemist who was to take all temperature readings and to check the CO-2 concentration in the No. 4 hold. Captain Mcgee agreed to this demand.

The meeting adjourned at 0300 hours. While waiting to go ashore, the fire officers once again warned the owner's agent and representative that the owners of the Severn River failed to heed our recommendations and advice. The Severn River owners spent over $70,000 trying to save a cargo that finally sold for ten cents on the dollar. We re-iterated the fact that CO-2 was not a coolant, but a smothering agent. We flatly predicted that the CO-2 plan would not work and that they would eventually have to unload some, or all of the turnings, as per our original recommendations. Further, a strong possibility existed, that we would have to flood the hold to save the ship from structural damage.

We left the Pontos at 0345 hours and returned to quarters. Chief Inlow gave a complete report of the meeting to Division Commander Renfro at 0630 hours. All three fire officers who were aboard the Pontos for the first meeting were scheduled to work SOD in their assignments this same day, June 16th. At 1500 hours, Division Commander J. W. Langston, Battalion Chiefs Brown and Inlow and Captain Pleick, using Fireboat 3, boarded the Pontos at anchorage to check the progress of the CO-2 plan. A Marine Chemist, Mr. Wayne Beck, Harbor Testing Laboratories, was aboard and had just taken temperature readings. These readings were taken above the turnings through the ventilators. He was rather vague about the readings, but indicated temperatures were above 200 F. He said that they were going to drive a length of 1 1/2" pipe down into the turnings in order to get a more accurate reading. He was questioned as to the percentage of CO-2 that was in the area above the cargo. He said he had a 40% concentration. He was then asked if the oxygen content was reduced to 12 or 13 percent. His instrument for measuring the gases showed no oxygen readings. To us this meant only one thing, the metal turnings were starving the area of the oxygen and were probably forming Iron Oxide which could create Hydrogen.

Captain McGee then arrived and introduced the fire officers to Captain A. L. Lucas, who was representing the shippers and who had flown out from New York. Captain McGee also told us that he had hired a SCUBA diver to check the hull surrounding the No. 4 hold. While we waited for the SCUBA diver to complete his inspection and survey, we talked to Captain Lucas. He was quite concerned about the fire and was contemplating the removal of some of the other cargo onto barges to lighten the load so that the Pontos could move to Berth 210, the Hugo-Nue Proler dock. However, he said he was willing to wait out the 48 hour period. He offered the opinion that this load of shavings may have received some metal borings in with the turnings. If so, then this could be one of the reasons that this load of turnings had caught fire.

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A short time later, the SCUBA diver came back on deck and reported that he had felt a "warm spot" about 32 feet below the water line and near the after port side of the hull. (This warmth was felt through leather gloves in 63 F. water). We left the ship at 1640 hours knowing the CO-2 plan was not working.

On June 17, 1970, Battalion Chief E. J. Canfield, Battalion 16, "A" Platoon, using Fireboat 3 went aboard the Pontos at 0900 hours. No other fire officer was with him. He talked to Captains McGee and Lucas. They were still hopeful that the temperatures would lower and that the Pontos could sail soon. No other visitations were made that day.

On June 18, 1970, Chief Inlow, working SOD in Battalion 16, called the Port Warden and requested Captain DeSanty to accompany him on a reinspection tour of the Pontos. The 48 hour period had ended. As Fireboat 3 approached the Pontos, Captain McGee was observed going down the gangway ready to go ashore in a waiting water taxi. He was hailed and asked to come aboard the fireboat. With Chief Inlow on this tour were Battalion Chief W. L. Olsen, working SOD in Battalion 6 and Captain Pleick. Once on board, Captain McGee said he was going ashore to seek the advice of a Metallurgist, as things were not going as he had planned. The Port Warden told Captain McGee to be available as a final meeting would probably take place that afternoon.

As we walked up the deck to the No. 4 hold, the chemist was removing the thermometer from the ventilator. The Chief Mate grabbed the thermometer and immediately burned his fingers. The readings now were over 450 F.

We went ashore and Captain DeSanty arranged for another meeting of all concerned to be held in the Captain's Library aboard the Pontos at 1330 hours.

Present at that meeting were: The Master of the Pontos, Captain A. D. Carlsen; the Port Warden, Captain DeSanty; Ensign O' Brian, USCG; Captain M. L. McGee, representing the owners through the owners association of Scandinavian ship owners (similar to our Western Gas and Oil Association); Captain J. S. Parry, representing the insurers of the cargo; Captain A. L. Lucas, representing the shippers; Mr. George Dupuy representing the insurers of the hull and ship; Mr. Dwayne Walsworth, General Steamship Corp., the agents for the owners; Mr. Wayne Beck, Harbor Testing Laboratories; Mr. Yuzo Nishi, the New York Agent for the Mitsui Co., owners of the cargo, Mr. Ryuzo Nikada, Traffic Manager for the Los Angeles Office of the Mitsui Co.; Mr. Harry Faversham, Vice-President, National Metals Co.; Mr. Pete Moore, Terminal Supervisor, Bulk Loading Terminal, Berth 49; Captain P. P. Pleick, Fireboat 4 and Battalion Chief N.M. Inlow, Battalion 16, "B" Platoon.

Once again, the Port Warden opened the meeting with the necessary introductions then stated that a decision must be made immediately to remove the turnings from the Pontos. He turned the meeting over to Chief Inlow who was directed to make any or all recommendations that the Fire Department thought necessary to off load the Pontos and for protection of the Bulk Terminal Facilities.

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The Fire Department's requirements were:

The Pontos must be moved to Berth 49 not later than 0700 hours, June 19, 1970, or we would not allow the ship to enter the harbor and use our wharf facilities.

There must be at least 10 tons of bulk CO-2 on the wharf as the Pontos tied up. The bulk CO-2 container must supply at least one appropriate line with approved nozzle to reach the No. 4 hold. Additional CO-2 must be placed into the fore and aft ventilators above the hot metal with the valve open when the hatch was uncovered. A qualified operator of the nozzle must be at the hold at all times when off loading.

The turnings must be removed either with a six yard clam shell at the Berth 49 facilities or with a magnetic crane. The turnings were to be placed in waiting dump trucks. The dump trucks then must take the turnings to an open area and spread them out in the open, not over two feet high.

A means of extinguishing the removed turnings must be available at the dump site.

The Port Warden agreed to our requirements and added several of his own. (See attached copy of the Port Wardens restrictions).

Captain McGee requested an additional extension of time. He wanted us to try mechanical foam on the turnings and was promptly refused. Once again everyone present was told that there would be no more delays. Captain Carlsen spoke up and said he would agree to all of our requirements.

Mr. Nishi and Mr. Nikada, owners of the cargo, were asked by Chief Inlow if they concurred. Mr. Nikada said that they had listened carefully to everything that had been said. He also stated that he believed that the Fire Officers knew exactly what they were demanding and would abide by their recommendations. However, Mr. Nikada said that is was the custom of his country to allow the Captain of the ship to make the final decision. He turned to Captain Carlsen and asked what he had decided and Captain Carlsen replied, "I want to be off loaded at Berth 49 tomorrow".

Up to this meeting, it had never been too clear to any of the fire officers, why every attempt to move the Pontos to Berth 49 with the necessary depth for the Pontos, was always turned down by the representatives of the owners, the agents and the insurers. We learned at this meeting that the shipper in Jersey City is a subsidiary of the Hugo-Nue Proler Corp. and that the Bulk Loading Terminal at Berth 49 is operated by National Metals, a direct competitor. The meeting adjourned at 1600 hours and the Pontos was to be moved to Berth 49 at 0700 hours June 19th.

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The ship started to off load at 1100 hours that day. The six yard clam shell was used, then swung around onto the wharf and the turnings placed into waiting dump trucks. The trucks carried the turnings to an open area and spread the shavings. Small fires occurred in the open areas where the turnings were placed and were covered with dirt to control the fires.

As soon as the afternoon breeze came up, the after port area of the cargo started to burn. The CO-2 nozzle was used to knock down the flame and the hatch was closed for over an hour. CO-2 was then added to the hold and when the chemist reported a 40% concentration the hatch was opened and off loading continued. This type of off loading continued intermittently, until approximately 1100 hours, Sunday, June 21, 1970. At that time, the port after section of the cargo started to burn with a greater severity than had been previously experienced. The CO-2 was unable to extinguish all of the fire before the Chief Mate got the hatch covers into position and closed the hatch. The Chief Mate, who operated the hydraulic controls for the hatch covers, burned his hands and the deck plates above the fire were warped from the heat. Captain McGee and Dr. Melvin Gerstein, a Metallurgist and chairman of the Mechanical Engineering Department, USC, witnessed the fire and Dr. Gerstein advised Captain McGee of the dangers of hydrogen explosions and the apparent hazard of severely damaging the structure of the ship from either the fire or an explosion. Captain McGee contacted the Port Warden and the Fire Department requesting another meeting aboard the Pontos for 1300 hours that day.

Battalion Chief W. B. Nash was working a SOD day in Battalion 6 and had been requested by Chief Brown when relieved, to call Chief Inlow at home if anything of importance occurred aboard the Pontos. Chief Nash called Chief Inlow at home telling him of the scheduled meeting aboard the Pontos at 1300 hours. Chief Nash told Chief Inlow a decision was to be made to flood the No. 4 hold. Chief Inlow requested Chief Nash to notify Westlake and request the the on-call Deputy Chief be notified of this meeting and request his attendance in order to make the decision to commit our fire boats to flood the hold. Chief Inlow agreed to attend the meeting.

Present at this final meeting were the same people who had attended the previous one, except for Captain Lucas who had returned to New York and Mr. Nishi. Additional persons in attendance were Acting Division Commander A. V. McKaskle; Battalion Chief W. B. Nash and Dr. Melvin Gerstein.

Captain McGee was the spokesman and stated that they had decided that in order to save the ship and the rest of the cargo it was necessary to flood the No. 4 hold. Mr. Faversham spoke up and flatly said that the Pontos would not be flooded at Berth 49 as he was expecting the arrival of a ship for loading iron ore on the 2nd of July. Obviously, the only means to flood the hold was by our fireboats as there were no so called "seacocks" to open and let the ship flood herself.

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It would have to be done by using our fireboats to supply the required capacity to quickly flood the hold. Chief Inlow told the group that he did not have the authority to allow our fireboats to be tied up for the length of time that would be required to fill the hold. (1,7000,000 gals. est.) He said that the acting Chief Engineer, Deputy Chief Harry W. Martin had been notified of this meeting and was on his way. While waiting for Chief Martin, a group discussion was held as to the best way to flood the hold without doing any structural damage and to eliminate as much as possible the probability of an explosion. Everyone agreed that the better way would be to flood had from the bottom up which would allow the water to rise up slowly through the shavings lessening the explosion hazard.

The possibility of sending a diver down with a cutting torch and cutting a hole in the bottom to allow the sea water to enter from below was explored and discarded due the design of the ship. (See attached cross-sectional diagram of the No. 4 hold.) Dr. Gerstein predicted that if the water was poured in at the top, the density of the scrap turnings could create the explosions that were feared. As Chief Martin arrived, it had been agreed that if he allowed the use of our fireboats it would be necessary to design some type of pipe to place the water at the lowest level in the hold. Chief Martin was briefed on the happenings and decisions by his fire officers and gave approval to use our large fireboats. Chief Martin stayed after the meeting and with Captain McGee aided in the design of an intake manifold which placed the water at the bottom of the cargo in the No. 4 hold. They designed a "T" shaped manifold inlet equipped to receive four 3 1/2" hose lines from the boat. The horizontal section of the manifold was 50' long made of 8" pipe with four 3 1/2" male steamer connections, welded at a 45 degree angle. The 50' length spanned the hatch opening and was placed in saddles which were spot-welded to the deck. In the center of the 50' horizontal section a 30' length of 8" pipe was welded and used as the "down spout" giving the "T" shape. (See attached drawing) Captain McGee ordered two of these manifolds to be made and ready for use by 0700 hours, June 22, 1970.

At 0830 hours, Chiefs Brown and Inlow were aboard the Pontos to prepare the manifold inlet. Fireboat 2 came alongside at 0900 hours and laid four 3 1/2" hose lines, each 150' long on deck and connected into the inlet. At 0915 hours, Battalion Chiefs J. H. Shern and F. N. Leavitt from the Fire Prevention Bureau came aboard to observe the flooding operations. Both were present at the request of Chief Inlow who had consulted Chief Shern about metal turning fires. Chief Shern confirmed the predictions made by Dr. Gerstein concerning the danger of a hydrogen explosion. However, Chief Shern was of the opinion that if the water penetrated the turnings as fast as it was applied the 2000 sq. ft. of hatch opening was probably adequate to vent the steam which would be created

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Prior to the time the tugs were to move the Pontos to anchorage, Deputy Chief Long, Bureau Commander, Bureau of Fire Suppression and Rescue, came aboard and assumed command of the flooding operations. With Chief Long were Chief Officers from Division 1 and 3 who were aboard as observers. Chief Inlow asked Captain McGee to brief our officers to give them a background of this ship and the fire in the hold. Captain McGee agreed and a briefing session was held in the Ward Room as the Pontos moved to anchorage.

Fireboat 2 met the Pontos at anchorage and continued to finish the connections into the one 8" manifold inlet. The inlet was placed in the forward part of the hold as it was the first area exposed when the hatch was opened and the last when the hatch was closed

At 1405 hours, Fireboat 2 was ordered to start pumping. They pumped at 240 lbs. After the first few minutes, it was apparent that the water was penetrating the turnings better than had been anticipated. Small fingers of steam were observed emerging from the pile. This told us that if the steam escaped as the water level rose the danger of a steam or hydrogen explosion no longer existed. Soon after the boat started pumping, two more lines of 3 1/2" hose were connected to the second manifold inlet. The pump pressures were then lowered to 180 pounds.

At the end of the first hour of pumping, the Chief Mate took soundings of the height of the water, which showed seven feet for the first hour. At the end of the second hour, the soundings showed 16 feet. We were now pumping at the rate of nine feet per hour. As the water rose in the hold, the volume of steam billowing from the open hatch increased. There were no explosions at any time. During the last hour of pumping hissing noises were quit audible which indicated to us that the fire may have been higher in the hold than thought. At 2005 hours the turnings were covered with 12 inches of water. The water was 43 feet deep. The temperature of the water was 155 F.

During the filling operations, Captain McGee had two large gasoline driven portable pumps with 6" suction brought aboard to be used to pumpout the hold. Captain McGee who was really happy about the flooding operations, was asked by the fire officers how he was going to pump out the remaining 25 feet of water. He said by adding another section. He was given a quick lesson in basic hydraulics. He then placed an order for two large submersible pumps.

All of the Chief Officers, except Renfro, Brown and Inlow left the Pontos as soon as she was flooded. Fireboat 2 returned to quarters at 2100 hours. The marine surveyors had computed that the Pontos would lower 7 feet to a draft of 43 feet. The remaining fire officers and the Chief Mate, in Fireboat 3 circled the Pontos slowly to establish exactly how much she had lowered. The Chief Mate computed that she had a draft of 44 1/2' forward, 43 1/2' midship and 43' aft. Therefore, the ship had settled 8 1/2' in the bow. We computed that we had pumped approximately 1,700,000 gallons for an additional weight of 7500 tons.

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An LAFD Helicopter, which had been used as an observation platform during the flooding operations, was landed on the forward hatch cover. Chief Renfro went ashore at 2130. Chiefs Brown and Inlow stayed aboard while the Pontos was towed back to Berth 49 at 2300 hours. She was at the dock at 0100 hours, June 23, 1970. Final plans for pumping out the ship and off loading the cargo were made during this trip.

The portable pumps on deck started to remove the water which was places in her upper wing tanks (it was polluted with cutting oil). As soon as the water level was lowered, a bulldozer was placed in the hold to move the turnings from the wings into the square of the hold. Off-loading operations were completed on the afternoon of June 28, 1970. The Pontos sailed for Nizushima, Japan on the night of the 28th with no cargo in the No. 4 hold and water in the wing tanks for ballast.

THE COST

Captain McGee admitted to Chief Inlow that the company had spent over $120,000 for unloading, CO-2, chemists, water taxis, Tug Boats, etc. The damaged cargo which originally sold for $368,000, was sold for 15 cents on the dollar. The owners are very happy, Captain Carlsen is convinced that we are really No. 1 and Captain McGee is certain he did everything he could for the owners. The cost may have been considerably lower if our original recommendations had been accepted.

ADDENDA

After being completely flooded, the removed turnings started to burn when spread in the open areas. At least five separate fires involved the turnings.

Some of the turnings were placed in rail road gondolas, these turnings started to burn with some severity on the morning of July 15, 1970, over two weeks after they had been removed. We knew this would probably happen. On the Severn River fire, the owners had her moved to Long Beach rather than comply with our requirements. Long Beach was warned about placing the turnings into gondolas. Long Beach didn't listen and three days later, 17 gondolas were on fire. Long Beach ordered the Severn River out of her harbor and she returned to Los Angeles Harbor and finished off loading under our requirements.