UNITED STATES COAST
GUARD
RECORD OF
PROCEEDINGS
of a
BOARD OF
INVESTIGATION
convened at
11th
U.S.C.G. District
Long Beach, California
To inquire into the
explosion and fire aboard the SS MARKAY at Berth 167, Mormon Island,
Los Angeles Harbor, California, at or about 2:06 a.m. on 22 June,
1947. |
FINDING OF FACTS,
CONCLUSIONS,
OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
VOLUME III --
F I N A L
Pages 1 to 18 incl. |
I N D E X
|
Page |
Exhibits appended |
. . . . . . ."B" |
Finding of Facts |
. . . . . .
. . 1 |
Conclusions |
. . . . . .
. .11 |
Opinion |
. . . . . .
. .12 |
Recommendation |
. . . . . .
. .16 |
|
|
|
Neither the Board, the recorder, nor the parties to the
investigation desired to call any more
witnesses.
At 9:30 a.m. on 7
July, 1947, the Board convened to analyze
the facts and to formulate the
conclusions, opinions and
recommendations; and at 4:00 p.m. adjourned.
At 9:30 a.m. on 8
July, 1947, the Board convened to analyze
the facts and to formulate the
conclusions, opinions and
recommendations; and at 4:00 p.m. adjourned.
At 9:30 a.m. on 9
July, 1947, the Board convened to analyze
the facts and to formulate the
conclusions, opinions and
recommendations; and at 4:00 p.m. adjourned.
At 9:30 a.m. on 10
July, 1947, the Board convened to analyze
the facts and to formulate the
conclusions, opinions and
recommendations; and at 3:00 p.m. adjourned.
The investigation was
finished, the parties thereto withdrawing.
After full and mature
deliberation, the Board finds as
follows: |
-1-
FINDING OF FACTS
1. The SS
Markay is an ocean tankship, official number 242355, of
10342 gross tons, length 503.9 feet. She was built of steel with a
riveted hull at Chester, Pa., in 1942, and was documented at
Wilmington,Delaware. She was classed 1-A-1 (E) by the American
Bureau of
Shipping,and 100 A-1 by Lloyds. Special Survey No.1 was
completed on 12 December, 1946. The MARKAY's last annual inspection
was completed at Los Angeles, California, on 13 December, 1946. She
was approved for the carriage of inflammable and combustible liquids
of Grade A, not to exceed 25 lbs. Reid Vapor Pressure and all lower
grades; cargo capacity 138523 barrels.
2. The MARKAY is owned by the Keystone Tank Ship
Corporation, 100
W. 10th Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Her agents at Los Angeles are
W. H. Wickersham Co., 111 W. 7th Street, San Pedro, California.
3. The SS MARKAY left Astoria, Oregon, in ballast at 8:30
a.m. on
19 June, 1947, bound for Wilmington, California. En route all cargo
tanks with the exception of No. 7 across were butterworthed or
washed in preparation for receiving any type of liquid cargo. All
tanks with the exception of No. 7 across were therefore
comparatively gas-free on arrival off Los Angeles Harbor at 1:00
p.m. on 21 June, 1947. The vessel moored at the Shell Oil Terminal,
Berth 167, Mormon Island, Wilmington, California, at 2:00 p.m. on 21
June, 1947, at which time Captain Karl I. Hogstrom, Port Captain,
and Mr. Robert J. Hicks, Engineering Inspector of the Keystone Tank
Ship Corporation, boarded the vessel to advise the Master and the
Chief Engineer of the cargo that was to be loaded, and to assure
themselves that the vessel was ready
|
-2-
to receive the various commodities.
Captain Hogstrom and Mr. Hicks
were to stay aboard the vessel during loading operations to insure that
the vessel would be loaded expeditiously and depart on schedule.
4. The Master of the vessel, John T. Torrance, paid off
and signed on
several crew members after the vessel docked. Captain Hogstrom
informed Captain Torrance that the vessel was to load a butane-blended
gasoline cargo in Nos. 4, 5, and 6 tanks across and that therefore no
smoking would be permitted aboard the vessel during loading operations,
no cooking would be permitted in the galley and the crew would be fed
ashore. The Master thereupon ordered that the galley be locked, air
ports be closed and dogged, all watertight doors on the main and upper
decks be closed and kept closed, all ventilators on the after house
be trimmed away from the loading deck, and that the engine room
skylights be closed. These instructions were carried out under
the
supervision of the Chief Engineer and the Chief Officer.
5. Immediately after docking, the Boatswain, along with
the deck
watch and deck maintenance men, connected up three cargo hoses to the
ship's loading lines, located between No. 5 and No. 6 tanks on the
starboard side of the main deck, one cargo hose to a riser on the
starboard side of the forward deck in the way of No. 2 tank, and a
"Y" connection on the after deck in the way of No. 8 tank to
load
Diesel fuel in No. 8 wing tanks over-all. After these hoses had been
connected to the deck crewman with the exception of the watch were
dismissed, and it being Saturday afternoon, were not required to
perform any other duty aboard the vessel. The Steward's stores were
on the dock at the time the vessel moored and were taken
aboard by a shore gang while
|
-3-
cargo hoses were being
connected. The Steward's department personnel
stowed these stores in the vessel's store rooms aft and were then
dismissed for the day. The Chief Engineer on the advice of the
Engineering Inspector, Mr. Hicks, required two Assistant Engineer
Officers to remain aboard the vessel during loading operations;
these Engineer Officers were to stand alternate 8-hour watches in the
engine room with a full engine room and fire room crew, consisting of
a Fireman-Watertender and an Oiler. Before arrival at the loading
berth, all scuppers from the main deck were plugged and cemented.
6. At 3:45 p.m., after the Steward's stores had been
loaded and
all watertight doors and ports closed, loading commenced. 80-octane
aviation gasoline was started in No. 1 tanks.
7. At 3:55 p.m., 91-octane aviation gasoline was started
in
No. 2 wing tanks.
8. At 4:00 p.m., Diesel fuel was started into No. 8 wing
tanks
overall.
9. At 4:25 p.m., butane-blended gasoline, consisting of
31% butane,
and 69% of 80 to 350 degrees Fahrenheit straight-run and natural
gasoline, was started in No. 4 tanks across. This commodity was
delivered to the vessel from the Shell Oil Refinery about 5 miles
distant at a rate of approximately 3000 barrels per hour.
10. At 6:40 p.m., the loading of 80-octane gasoline into
No. 1
tanks was completed.
11. At 6:40 p.m., the loading of Diesel fuel into No. 8
wing
tanks was completed. Sometime later the deck watch with the
assistance of the dock foreman disconnected the hoses
from the "Y" and put them ashore, |
-4-
then closed and dogged the
hatch covers to No. 8 wing tanks. During
this operation a small quantity of Diesel oil from the hose was spilled
on deck.
12. At 7:15 p.m., stove oil was started into No. 8
center tank
through a stripper line.
13. At 7:25 p.m., the loading of 91-octane aviation
gasoline in
No. 2 wing tanks was completed. After the completion of the
91-octane
aviation gasoline which was shifted from No. 1 stripper line to No. 3
stripper line so that premium gas (red ethyl) could be loaded into
No. 2 center tank. During the disconnecting of this hose, some of
the commodity which was in the hose was spilled on deck, estimated at
from 5 to 30 gallons. The Chief Mate, Mr. Henriksen, who along with
Mr. Clendenny, the Third Mate, supervised the shifting of this hose,
claimed that the line had been washed with water from the dock and
that the commodity that was spilled on deck was therefore mostly water.
14. At 8:30 p.m., premium gasoline (red ethyl) was
started into
No. 9 tanks; this commodity was also delivered from the Shell Refinery.
15. At 11:00 p.m., the loading of stove oil was
completed in No. 8
center tank; this left only premium gasoline (red ethyl) and the
butane-blended gasoline being loaded at this time. The Chief Mate
stated that at or about this time he had opened and closed the
starboard doors to the shelter deck space to facilitate loading
operations and was aware that Mr. Clendenny, the Third Mate, had
done likewise.
16. After the stove oil in No. 8 center tank had been
topped off
at or about 11:00 p.m., Mr. Henrikesn, the Chief Mate, turned the loading |
-5-
supervision over to Mr.
Merle P. Clendenny, the Third Mate, and went
to his room to turn in. At this time he met George A. Lamoree, the
Radio Operator, who had just returned aboard the vessel from shore.
Lamoree informed the Mate that he was going to bed. The Chief Mate
then lay down in his bunk in his quarters amidships, but because of
the heat and the gas fumes within the quarters, he was unable to sleep;
he then took his pillow from his bunk and went out on the dock to his
car which was parked approximately 100 ft. from the gangway and went
to sleep in his car. The only persons in the midship deck-house at
this time, so far as is known, were the Port Captain, Karl I Hogstrom,
who was using the Master's quarters, and the Radio Operator, who was
in his quarters on the port side of the upper bridge deck.
17. Between 11:00 p.m. and midnight the center and
starboard No. 4
wing tanks were topped off. During the topping off of these tanks,
gas
fumes were so strong on the main deck in the way of No. 4 loading valves
that the loading crew was unable to remain near them, and this gaseous
condition extended all along the starboard side of the forward main
deck of the vessel. For this reason the Third Mate, Mr. Clendenny,
opened the starboard doors to the shelter deck space where he and two
of the loading crew sought refuge from the fumes and from which position
they took turns in closing down the valves to the starboard and center
No. 4 wing tanks, and relayed signals to a seaman stationed at No. 5
center tank, abaft the midship house, to open up the loading valve
to that tank.
18. At midnight the 12:00 to 4:00 a.m. watch relieved
the 8:00 to 12:00
watch with the exception of the Third Mate, Mr. Clendenny, who had |
-6-
arranged to take the
mid-watch for the Second Mate who liven in Long
Beach. At this time, the butane-blended gasoline was being loaded
into No. 4 port wing and No. 5 center tanks.
19. Shortly after midnight, No. 9 tanks across (red
ethyl) were
topped off. There was no evidence that premium gasoline (red ethyl)
was being loaded into any tank other than No. 2 center subsequent to
this time.
20. After No. 9 tanks were topped off, No. 4 port wing
tank (butane-
blend) was topped off and No. 5 port and starboard wings opened for
butane-blend. This operation was completed shortly before 2:00 a.m.,
after which time the only tanks being loaded were the No. 2 center tank
with premium gasoline (red ethyl) and No. 5 tanks across with butane-
blended gasoline. No. 3 tanks across, No. 6 tanks across, and No. 7
tanks across were still empty. Fumes in the way on No. 5 tanks at
this time were said to haven been strong.
21. At or about 1:30 a.m., Ronald G. Lossner, A.B., returned
aboard
the vessel from shore liberty. Arthur O. Gunderson, O.S., who was a
member of the loading watch at this time, requested Mr. Lossner to
relieve him so that he might go ashore. Mr. Lossner refused, but on
going to his quarters found that it was too hot there to sleep because
of the ports and doors being closed; so he returned to the deck and
relieved Gunderson. Gunderson then dressed and went ashore at about
2:00 a.m. As Gunderson went over the gangplank he exchanged a few
words with the A.Bs of the watch who were leaning over the rail in the
way of No. 5 tanks. Gunderson did not see the Third Mate at this
time.
22. Weather data obtained from the Marine Exchange,
official weather |
-7-
observers in Los Angeles
Harbor for the U. S. Weather Bureau, indicated
that weather conditions at 2:00 a.m. on 22 June, 1947, were as follows:
Partly cloudy
Visibility 6 miles
Wind: West, force:2 miles per hour
Barometer: 29.89
Temperature: wet bulb - 59 degrees F.
dry bulb - 62 degrees F.
Humidity: 84%
(see Exhibit No. 3) |
23. At about 2:00
a.m., Eric Martinsen, Q.M., a member of the loading
watch, suggested to Mr. Clendenny, Third Mate, that he be permitted to go
aft and make coffee for the watch; Mr. Clendenny agreed. At
this time the
rest of the loading watch were standing on the port side of the main
deck
in the way of No. 5 port wing tank. At or about 2:06 a.m., while
Martinsen
was in the crew pantry in the after-deck house preparing to make coffee,
an
explosion occurred amidships. Martinsen ran from the pantry to
the
fantail, slid down a mooring line to the dock and ran to safety.
Mr.
Gunderson, who had gone ashore about 2:00 a.m., had just reached the
terminal gate where he was waiting for a taxi; the explosion
knocked
Gunderson from his feet; on picking himself up he observed the
flames
emanating from the SS MARKAY and ran for safety. Neither of these
men was
able to state where the initial explosion or fire occurred.
24.
Mr. Robert J. Hicks, Engineering Inspector, who was sitting in a
chair
in the Chief Engineer's room in the after deck house at the time,
was
knocked to the deck by the force of the explosion. When he got to
his
feet, he looked out of the port hole to the forward deck and observed
the
deck afire just aft of the midship house. He also went down a stern
line
to safety. |
-8-
25. The Third
Assistant Engineer, Mr. Clyde L. Hammer, who was asleep in
his room in the after deck house, was awakened by the explosion and
found
that all the lights were out in that section of the vessel. He felt
his
way to the Chief Engineer's room and looked out to the forward deck
where
he saw that the deck from the midship house aft was afire. He then
went to
the engine room door and yelled to the crew below, but received no
responses, and then made his way to the fantail where he started down
a
stern line, but because of the intense heat dropped off the line into
the
water and swam to the dock. He was severely burned on the arms, beck
and
legs while leaving the vessel. Several other members of the crew who
were
sleeping in the after quarters found their way to safety in the same
manner.
26. Mr. James Walker,
a laboratory technician of the Shell Oil Company,
was engaged in the making tests of samples taken from the vessel in
the
dock laboratory ashore which was located about 150 ft. from the ship
directly opposite the midship house. Mr. Walker stated that his back
was
to a window overlooking the forward deck and midship house; that
when the
blast occurred, he was staggered, but that he looked over his
shoulder
through he window and observed that the blast occurred abaft the
midship
house and that when he regained his balance, the flames had not
extended
forward of the midship house. He then left the vicinity to seek
safety and
did not observe anything further.
27. Mr. Harry A.
Arndt, pumpman for the Shell Oil Company, who was in the
pump house ashore at the time of the explosion, stated that he heard
something which he could not define which warned him that a casualty
was
occurring and that he automatically fell flat on the floor. |
-9-
of the pump room. He
stated that he was conscious of a crackling noises,
similar to that caused by lighting, immediately preceding the explosion.
28. Mr. Lee Wyant, Los Angeles Harbor pilot, who was piloting a
vessel
out of Los Angeles Harbor and was about a mile distant from the MARKAY
when the explosion occurred, stated that he heard sounds similar to
shotgun blasts in rapid succession immediately preceding the major
explosion.
29. Mr. L. E. Fawcett, operator of the CROWLEY #26, a tow boat
under
charter of the United Towing Company of Wilmington, California, stated
that he was approaching Berth 168 immediately astern of the MARKAY
with an oil barge when the explosion occurred. He stated that he was
looking directly at the MARKAY and saw the initial blast and subsequent
flame emanate from a position on the port side of the main deck just
abaft the midship house and that burning gasoline immediately spurted
out of the vessel and within three minutes had crossed slip No. 1 and set
afire the warehouses and docks in that area. He immediately
backed his tug away and left the vicinity.
30. The statement of these various persons indicate that the initial
explosion occurred on the port side of the main deck somewhere in
the
vicinity of No. 5 tanks into which butane-blended gasoline was being
loaded.
31. A physical examination of the SS MARKAY by the Board on 7 July,
1947, revealed that the main deck of the vessel had been ruptured in
the way of No. 3 tanks and that the deck from its intersection with
the transverse bulkhead between No. 3 and No. 4 tanks had been rolled
back over the top of No. 2 tank expansion trunks. The midship house |
-10-
was almost completely
demolished and melted down into an unrecognizable
mass. The deck in the way of No. 7 tank was also ruptured with both
the
port and center sections of the deck from its intersection with the
transverse bulkhead between No. 6 and No. 7 tanks rolled back over No. 8
port and center expansion trunks, and the section of deck covering No. 7
starboard wing tank was blown completely loose from the vessel and was
resting on the shore approximately 100 ft. away. The after bulkhead
of the shelter deck space had been blown completely loose from its
welded boundary connections and was lying across the loading pipe lines
between No. 6 port and center tanks. The starboard after door of the
shelter deck with all but one dog torn loose was resting on the shore
in the vicinity of the section of deck from No. 7 starboard wing tank,
indicating a violent explosion within the shelter deck space. The
vessel itself has been burned completely over its entire outside area
and within the after quarters, engine and fire room spaces.
32. The Shell Terminal dock in the way of Berth 167 was completely
destroyed as was the pump house and laboratory. Burning gasoline from
the vessel also destroyed the docks and warehouses on the opposite side
of Slip No. 1, immediately opposite the MARKAY.
33. Eight crew members of the MARKAY and the Port Captain of the
Key-
stone Tank Ship Corporation are known to be dead or missing, as are
three wharfingers of the Shell Oil Company who were on duty on the dock
at the time of the explosion. (See Coroner's Report appended.)
Twelve
crew members were injured and received medical treatment; of this
number,
nine were hospitalized, none of whom was considered by the U.S.P.H.
Medical Officer at San Pedro, California, to have been seriously injured.
|
-11-
CONCLUSIONS (based
on facts)
1. That large
quantities of butane and gasoline vapors were present
about the decks of the MARKAY during the loading operations, especially
in the vicinity of the midship house. These vapors flowed out
through
the ullage holes and owing to atmospheric conditions (comparative calm
and high humidity), were not dissipated by natural means.
2. That similar vapors
accumulated in the midship quarters and
shelter deck space during the course of the loading.
3. That negligible quantities of similar vapors were present in the
engine room.
4. That no vapors were present in the quarters aft.
5. That the vapors just aft of, or in the after part of the midship
house were ignited by some cause the exact nature of which the Board was
Unable to determine due largely to the fact that all persons in the
immediate vicinity of the primary explosion were killed.
6. That the primary blast was followed in rapid succession by a
sweep of flame along the after deck, explosions in Nos. 7 and 3 tanks
(which were empty at the time), a torching from the open ullage holes
of No. 5 tanks, and a sweep of burning gasoline across the waterway
to the opposite side of the channel.
|
-12-
OPINIONS
1. That the fumes in
the midship house were admitted and distributed
through the opening and closing of doors leading into the Officers'
quarters, opening and closing the doors into the shelter deck space, and
from the shelter deck space to the Officers' quarters amidships.
2. That a violent explosion took place in the shelter deck space
amidships very early in the course of events as indicated by the fact
that the after bulkhead of this space was blown outward, landing across
the loading manifold atop No. 6 tanks and by the fact that the upper
decks over this part of the shelter deck space were sagged down over the
area from which the bulkhead had been torn.
3. That several possible sources of ignition existed within or
around the midship house, namely:
a. |
Speed regulators in
the bases of the electric fans
in the Officers' quarters and radio room. |
b. |
Non-watertight light
switches in the Officers'
quarters. |
c. |
Although the Board was
unable to secure any evidence
in regard to the final disposal made of the ends of
wire used in charging the spare battery by the Radio
Operator on the Friday preceding arrival in port
and referred to by several witnesses, there exists
a possibility that the wire ends remained in the
position testified to by the Boatswain until loading
commenced, in which case they would constitute a
possible source of ignition. |
|
d. |
Although the electric
light switch for the shelter
deck lights and the automatic pressure-actuated
switch for the fresh water pump motor located in
the shelter deck were presumably of the watertight
type, there is a possibility that they had become
defective, in which case they would be possible
sources of ignition. |
e. |
The Radio Operator and
the Port Captain were
occupying rooms midships at the time of the
explosion and might possibly have awakened and
turned on a light or operated a fan switch. |
f. |
A static electricity
spark in the rigging or else-
where about the ship might have ignited the vapors. |
4. That No. 6 port
tank was ruptured either from an internal
explosion or as a result of the explosion in No. 7 tanks. Owing to
the
awash condition of the deck the Board was unable to determine this more
definitely.
5. That No. 5 tank was opened as a result of the damage to No. 6
port and was the source of the gasoline which flowed across the channel.
6. The Board has carefully considered the actions of the Chief and
Third Mates in permitting the shelter deck compartment to be used,
first, as a refuge from the excessive fumes in the vicinity of Nos. 4
and 5 tanktops, and, second, as a passageway for relaying instructions
in connection with the toping off of No. 4 tanks and the transferring
of the flow of the butane-blend to No. 5 tank. Use of the shelter
deck in this manner was contrary to the Master's instructions in that
|
-14-
it involved the intermittent
opening and closing of the watertight
doors into this space, which doors, as well as all other weather doors
and ports, the Master had ordered to be closed and kept closed during
loading. Inasmuch as these doors opened into a space which was the
equivalent of a cofferdam, the opening and closing of such doors did not
constitute a violation of any of the Tanker Regulations and should not
have constituted a hazard. In fact, they might very well have been
left open during the entire loading period with the possibility, in
such a case, of improving ventilation of the deck in the vicinity of
Nos. 4 and 5 tanktops. The Chief and Third Mates were the senior
deck
Officers on board after the Master's departure and consequently it
became their duty to take whatever steps were in their judgment necessary
when any condition arose which might make a departure from strict
compliance with the Master's orders necessary.
7. Such a condition arose when, in topping off No. 4 tanks, the
fumes
forward of the midship house became so thick that it was necessary for
the crew to take turns in adjusting the loading valves. These thick
fumes extended some distance forward on the deck and at this time the
men were permitted to retire to the shelter deck between turns at the
valves. The Mates also considered that it was advisable to use this
space for the purpose of transmitting orders to the man stationed at the
valves to No. 5 tank which was the next tank to be loaded with the
butane-blend. This is common tanker practice.
8. The Master, in his orders, did not especially emphasize the doors
to the shelter deck space, but included them in his general instructions
that all ports and weather doors were to be closed and kept
closed. He |
-15-
himself had permitted
ordinary seaman, O'Donnell*, to enter the space
in question to obtain a lashing at the time the hose was shifted from
No. 1 to No. 3 stripper and it is probable that the Mates considered
this a precedent justifying their action in allowing the shelter deck
to be entered when, in their judgment, it was the proper thing to do.
9. Taking the foregoing circumstances into consideration, the Board
feels that the Mates' actions in this connection were not unjustifiable
under the existing conditions, in view of common tanker practice.
10. That the door at the top of the stairway from the shelter deck
to the Officer's quarters amidships should have been of gas-tight
construction.
11. That the electric light switch and current-interrupting device
for the automatic operation of the fresh water pump in the shelter deck
space should have been on the deck above.
12. That the two spills from loading hoses during the course of the
evening were minor in character and had no appreciable effect either
on the vessel's susceptibility to an explosion or to the fire afterward.
13. That the vessel was equipped with non-sparking tools for the
opening and closing of tanks, as required by the Rules.
14. The Board is of the opinion that gauging cargo tanks through
open ullage holes during transfer of cargo of high volatility, as was
done on the MARKAY, while not contrary to the Tanker Rules, is not the
safest practice, particularly during the loading of Grade A products.
*See O'Donnells's testimony;
Page 573, lines 10 to 16. |
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That the Tanker
Rules (Subchapter D) be amended as follows:
a. |
To require that ullage
plugs be tightly closed
during the loading of Grade A liquids so that
any discharge of vapors would take place at the
flame arrester at the top of the vent header
system. This is similar to the requirements for
the loading of liquified gases and would require
that approved liquid-gauging devices be fitted on
all tanks to be used for the carriage of Grade A
liquids. As an alternative to the foregoing,
the loading of any mixture or solution of an
inflammable gas, such as butane in gasoline
or any other carrier might be prohibited except
under the conditions set forth in Part 38 of
the Tanker Rules. |
b. |
To require that
transfer of cargo not be started
or if started, discontinued, if inflammable gasses
in explosive concentrations accumulate about the
decks or in any of these spaces required by the
Tanker Rules to be separated from cargo tanks by
cofferdams or equivalent spaces, and that
periodic tests for such explosive contamination
be made of the air in the above-mentioned spaces
by especially designated personnel whose duty
it shall be to make such periodic tests, observe
general safety conditions, and report on the same
to the senior deck officer in charge. |
|
-17-
c. |
To require that no
member of the ship's crew be re-
quired or permitted to be in charge of, or a member
of the loading force for a period longer than eight
hours at a stretch and if on such duty for eight
hours continuously, be required to have at least
six hours off duty before resuming such duty. |
2. That the
possibility of artificial ventilation of tank vessel
decks when loading operations are taking place during calms, by the
creation of an artificial wind to clear the decks of accumulated
gases, be explored.
3. That the properties of butane-blended gasoline be investigated
by a Government agency to determine whether or not there are any
special dangers in its transportation by sea.
4. That the escape of fumes through ullage holes be minimized
by providing tanks with properly designed sounding pipes, open at
the bottom, to permit manual gauging.
|
JOHN TREBES
Captain, U. S. Coast Guard
EDWARD STUART
Captain, U. S. Coast Guard (R)
PHILIP A. OVENDEN
Commander, U. S. Coast Guard (R)
|
|
-18-
The Board then, at
3:00 p.m. on 10 July, 1947, adjourned to await
the action of the convening authority.
|
JOHN TREBES
Captain, U. S. Coast Guard, Chairman
ADDISON S. ELLIOT
Lt. Commander, U. S. Coast Guard (R)
Recorder |
|
|